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Abstract 
 
In the mobile distributed environment, an entity may move across domains with great 
frequency. How to utilize the trust information in the previous domains and quickly establish 
trust relationships with others in the current domain remains a challenging issue. The classic 
trust models do not support cross-domain and the existing cross-domain trust models are not in 
a fully distributed way. This paper improves the outstanding Certified Reputation (CR) model 
and proposes a Lightweight Cross-domain Trust (LCT) model for the mobile distributed 
environment in a fully distributed way. The trust certifications, in which the trust ratings 
contain various trust aspects with different interest preference weights, are collected and 
provided by the trustees. Furthermore, three factors are comprehensively considered to ease 
the issue of collusion attacks and make the trust certifications more accurate. Finally, a 
cross-domain scenario is deployed and implemented, and the comprehensive experiments and 
analysis are conducted. The results demonstrate that our LCT model obviously outperforms 
the Bayesian Network (BN) model and the CR model in our cross-domain scenario, and 
significantly improves the successful interaction rates of the honest entities without increasing 
the risks of interacting with the malicious entities. 
 
 
Keywords: Trust model, lightweight, cross-domain, mobile distributed environment, fully 
distributed 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, mobile devices are so ubiquitous that the number of active mobile devices has 
already exceeded the world’s population according to GSMA (Global System for Mobile 
communications Assembly) Intelligence [1]. Besides, the mobile distributed environment is 
characterized by wireless, decentralized, dynamic, resource-limited, etc. 
The trust management in the mobile distributed environment is of necessity when an entity 
desires to establish an acceptable trust relationship with others and avoid interacting with the 
malicious or selfish entities. Thus more-recent work focuses on adopting trust management as 
a solution for the mobile distributed environment. 
Due to the distinctive characteristics of the mobile distributed environment, the trust in the 
mobile distributed environment has the following properties [2]: 
1) Subjective: Different trustors may determine different trust values towards to the same 
trustee due to different interaction experiences. 
2) Asymmetric: If Alice trusts Bob, it cannot guarantee that Bob trusts Alice to the same 
degree.  
3) Partly transitive: Given the fact that Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts John, the 
conclusion that Alice trusts John to the same degree as Bob does cannot be derived. 
4) Context-dependent: Different contexts may result in different trust values. For instance, 
Alice trusts that Bob is an excellent car mechanic but not a qualified doctor. 
5) Dynamic: The same trustor may derive different trust values towards to the same trustee 
at different times due to the rapid topology changes caused by entity mobility or failure. 
To take the aforementioned properties into consideration, an excellent trust model for the 
mobile distributed environment should satisfy the following requirements as far as possible: 
1) Cross-domain: In the mobile distributed environment, an entity may leave a domain 
and join in another one with great frequency. The trust information in the previous 
domains should be taken advantage of, as it contributes to quickly establishing the trust 
relationships with other entities in the current domain. 
2) Fully distributed way: To be consistent with the fully distributed characteristic of the 
mobile distributed environment, the trust model should be built in a fully distributed 
way without the super nodes or the third-party agents. Moreover, the trust information 
should be obtained in a lightweight manner in consideration of resource constraints. 
Besides, the trust relationships should be established quickly in view of the dynamic 
property of the trust in the mobile distributed environment. 
3) Fine granularity: As we know, the trust contains various aspects, such as honesty, 
stability and so on. To better describe trust, the trust model should contain various trust 
aspects with different weights, according to the personalized preferences of entities. 
4) Robustness: Due to the resource constraints in mobile distributed environment, selfish 
behaviors (e.g. refusing to provide its trust evaluations to other entities, refusing to act 
as relays for other entities, etc.) may occur. Moreover, malicious behaviors (e.g. 
providing terrible services to other entities, delaying or dropping data packages on 
purpose, etc.) are unavoidable because of the openness and decentralization of the 
mobile distributed environment. An excellent trust model should be able to detect and 
punish (or isolate) these misbehaving entities. 
5) High performance: A good trust model should be able to distinguish different kinds of 
entities (i.e. honest entities, general entities and malicious entities). Honest behaviors 
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should be stimulated while malicious ones should be punished. 
Recently, a mass of trust models for the mobile distributed environment have been proposed 
[3-14]. In the classic trust models (as shown in Fig. 1), it is assumed that the previous 
interactions occurred between A and C, A and D, E and B, F and B in the past, where A, B, C, 
D, E and F represent different entities in the mobile distributed environment. When A wants to 
interact with a strange entity B, it needs to collect the trust recommendations from its 
acquaintances or physical neighbours (i.e. E and F) which have interacted with B in the 
previous interactions. Then A utilizes some strategies to drive the trust value of B and decides 
whether to interact with it or not. After the interaction, if it occurs, A and B update the trust 
information in the local storage. In the above process, A and B are defined as trustor and 
trustee in many literatures [2, 15-16], respectively. Conversely, B can also collect and evaluate 
the trust value of A in the same way. 
A C
A D
E B
F B
Previous Interactions
A B
Potential Interaction
E
F
C
D
Trust
Recommendations
 
Fig. 1. Collecting the trust recommendations in the classic trust models 
 
Obviously, collecting the trust recommendations is of great difficulty due to the topology 
changes caused by entity mobility or failure in the mobile distributed environment. Moreover, 
this process leads to lots of bandwidth and time consumption and can hardly cross domains on 
account of resource constraints and privacy concerns. Therefore, if an entity leaves the 
previous domain and joins in the current domain, the trust relationships between the entity and 
others in the current domain have to be rebuilt with ignoring the previous trust information. It 
is distinctly unreasonable. 
In addition, in the existing cross-domain trust models [17-18], the super nodes or the 
third-party agents are supposed, which are inconsistent with the fully distributed characteristic 
of the mobile distributed environment. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no excellent 
trust model yet that can handle the cross-domain issue for the mobile distributed environment 
in a fully distributed way. It is just the motivation of this work. 
In this paper, we improve the outstanding CR model [19] and propose a novel LCT model 
for the mobile distributed environment. The features and contributions of our LCT model are 
summarized as follows: 
1) Our LCT model supports cross-domain: In our LCT model, the trust certifications are 
collected and provided by the trustees and the trust information can be carried across 
domains easily. Moreover, the trust relationships can be established more quickly and 
reach an excellent performance in a lightweight manner. 
2) Our LCT model is built in a fully distributed way: In the existing cross-domain 
schemes, the super nodes or the third-party agents are assumed, which are inconsistent 
with the fully distributed characteristic of the mobile distributed environment. However, 
both the super nodes and the third-party agents are not needed in our LCT model as it is 
built in a fully distributed way. 
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3) Our LCT model is fine-grained: To better describe trust, the trust ratings in the trust 
certifications contain various trust aspects with different interest preference weights in 
our LCT model, and they are donated by the linguistic variables. Furthermore, we adopt 
the fuzzy simple additive weighting system [20] to handle the inherent uncertainty of 
the human languages and derive the trust values.  
4) Our LCT model is of robustness: In our LCT model, three factors, namely the number 
of the trust certifications, the time decay of the trust certifications and the similarity 
between the trustors and the certifiers, are comprehensively considered to ease the issue 
of collusion attacks and make the trust certifications more accurate.  
5) Our LCT model is of high performance: To demonstrate the performance of our LCT 
model, we deploy and implement a cross-domain scenario, and conduct comprehensive 
experiments and analysis in this work. The results indicate that our LCT model is 
superior to the BN model [4] and the CR model, and significantly improves the 
successful interaction rates of the honest entities without increasing the risks of 
interacting with the malicious entities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a quick look at 
some related work and their limitations. Section 3 shows our trust model and trust evaluation 
method. Next, the experiments and analysis are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes 
this paper. 
2. Related Work 
In recent years, a number of trust models for the mobile distributed environment have been 
proposed. We review some ones in terms of the theories and tools used in them. 
Many researchers utilize Bayesian Network to evaluate the trust in the mobile distributed 
environment due to its suitable characteristics for causal reasoning [3-6]. Wang et al. [3] 
presented a Bayesian Network based trust model for the file sharing P2P (Peer-to-Peer) 
application. This model can derive the trust not only in a specific aspect, but also in a 
combination of various aspects. Dubey et al. [4] improved Wang’s trust model by taking the 
time window into account. This model can detect malicious entities earlier than Wang’s 
scheme. Wei et al. [5] proposed a trust model based on Bayesian Network for MANETs 
(Mobile Ad Hoc Networks). They mainly concentrate on easing the treats from the malicious 
attackers and a more reasonable trust score can be derived. Che et al. [6] presented a 
lightweight trust model based on both Bayesian Network and Entropy Theory for WSNs 
(Wireless Sensor Network). In their model, the weights of different trust aspects are derived 
from the Entropy Theory, instead of the experts artificially. 
There also exist lots of trust models based on friendship, and the trust recommendations 
from friends (e.g. acquaintances or physical neighbours) are the primary trust source in these 
schemes [7-10]. Liu et al. [7] presented a new complex social network structure and a MQCTT 
(Multiple Quality Constrained Trust Transitivity) trust model. This model conforms to the 
principles of social psychology and can obtain more accurate trust scores than the previous 
schemes. Shabut et al. [8] proposed a friendship-based trust model for MANETs to secure 
route. This model combines both direct interactive and indirect friendship-based trust 
information to derive the trust scores and also considers the decay of friendship degree over 
time. Dhurandher et al. [9] presented a FACES (Friend-based Ad hoc routing using 
Challenges to Establish Security) algorithm for secure routing in MANETs. The nodes do not 
need to listen to the traffic through their neighbours in this model, so the overhead of the 
network can be reduced significantly. Chang et al. [10] presented a lightweight trustworthy 
918                                         Liu et al.: LCT: A Lightweight Cross-domain Trust Model for the Mobile Distributed Environment 
service discovery scheme for service-oriented MSNs in proximity. This model can reduce the 
transaction costs and is equally credible as the classic schemes. 
Different from the above approaches, some researchers utilized other theories and tools to 
establish the trust model for the mobile distributed environment. Wei et al. [11] proposed a 
unified trust model based on uncertain reasoning to enhance the security of MANETs. It 
contains two trust model components: the direct trust component and the indirect trust 
component. The former is derived by the Bayesian Inference and the latter is obtained from the 
Dempster-Shafer theory. Deepa et al. [12] presented a directory-based trust model for service 
discovery. This model takes advantage of the Dezert-Smarandache theory to deal with the 
fusion of several trust evidences. Wang et al. [13] balanced trust value and end-to-end delay 
and designed a TQR (Trust-based QoS Routing) algorithm. It can prevent malicious attacks 
and improve the security performance of MANETs to some extent. Cao et al. [14] presented a 
PSTM (Proxy-based Security-feedback Trust Model) for MP2P (Mobile P2P). It can reduce 
the malicious and selfish behaviours and improve the successful interaction rates of the honest 
nodes. 
Although these aforementioned trust models provide some brilliant ideas, there is no 
consideration of the cross-domain issue in these models, which may limit the applications of 
these approaches. Han et al. [17] proposed a TPCommuTrust (Topological Potential weighted 
Community-based recommendation Trust) model, in which the trust information can be 
carried across communities. However, this model has two obvious drawbacks: a) The super 
nodes are assumed, which are inconsistent with the fully distributed characteristic of the 
mobile distributed environment. b) The cross-community nodes are supposed. This is also 
clearly unreasonable as different domains are probably disjoint and have no common nodes. 
Tian et al. [18] presented a novel MTC (Multi Trust Chain) model for cross-domain 
interactions. In this model, different domains can be disjoint, but a specialized entity (i.e. a 
third-party agent) is needed. This is also inconsistent with the fully distributed characteristic of 
the mobile distributed environment. Huynh et al. [19] proposed a CR model for the 
multi-agent systems, in which the trust information is collected by the trustees, instead of the 
trustors. Nevertheless, this model has four limitations as follows: a) The similarity weight is 
only derived from the distance of rating values, so if the trustor has no previous interaction 
with the trustee, the similarity weight is set to a default low value due to the absence of the 
rating value. b) The trust value is merely denoted as a number without the consideration of 
various trust aspects. c) This model does not take the number of the trust certifications as a 
weight. d) There is no consideration for cross-domain scenario in this model. 
 
Table 1. Intuitive comparisons between our LCT model and other trust models 
 
Trust Models Fully Distributed Way Cross-domain 
BN [4] √ × 
CR [19] √ × 
MQCTT [7] √ × 
FACES [9] √ × 
TQR [13] √ × 
PSTM [14] × × 
TPCommuTrust [17] × √ 
MTC [18] × √ 
LCT √ √ 
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To the best of our knowledge, there exists no outstanding trust model yet that can deal with 
the cross-domain issue for the mobile distributed environment in a fully distributed way. To 
tackle this problem, we propose a novel LCT model and the intuitive comparisons with other 
trust models are shown in Table 1 (in which “√” and “×” denote support and 
non-support, respectively). 
3. Our Trust Model and Evaluation Method 
Before introducing our trust model and evaluation method, we first consider all the possible 
relationships of two different domains as shown in Fig. 2: coincident, intersecting, tangent, 
containing, being contained, and disjoint. In the first five cases, the classic trust models can 
deal with the cross-domain issue as there exist common entities in two different domains and 
the trust recommendations can be collected from these common entities. Thus this paper 
focuses on the last case (i.e. two different domains are disjoint and have no common entities), 
which cannot be handled by the classic trust models. 
A BA(B)
A A B
IntersectingCoincident
B
Containing Being Contained Disjoint
A B
Tangent
AB
 
Fig. 2. All the possible relationships of two different domains 
 
Next, we demonstrate the cross-domain scenario in the mobile distributed environment as 
shown in Fig. 3. Previously, Bob was in Domain 1, he had some interactions with other 
entities in Domain 1 and accumulated a certain trust level. But he left from Domain 1 for some 
reasons at some point and now he is in Domain 2. The other entities in Domain 2 can hardly 
collect the trust evaluations from the entities which have interacted with Bob in Domain 1 in 
the classic trust models, as they belong to different domains. So the trust relationships between 
Bob and the other entities in Domain 2 have to be rebuilt with ignoring the previous trust 
information of Bob in Domain 1. It is distinctly unreasonable. How to utilize the trust 
information in the previous domains and quickly establish trust relationships with other 
entities in the current domain is the key focus of this paper. 
Domain 2
Domain 1
 
Fig. 3. The cross-domain scenario 
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3.1 Our Trust Model 
In order to deal with the cross-domain issue, we propose a novel LCT model (as show in Fig. 
4). For comparison, our model takes the same assumption for the previous interactions as the 
classic trust models shown in Fig. 1. When A wants to interact with a strange entity B, it first 
requests B to provide its own trust certifications, which are generated with digital signature 
information and sent to B by its previous interaction partners (i.e. E and F), and then stored and 
updated by B. After receiving these trust certifications from B, A can verify their authenticity 
through the digital signature technology when necessary. Then A can derive the trust value of 
B and decide whether to interact with B or not. After the interaction, if it occurs, A and B 
generate the trust certifications and send them to each other. In the above process, A and B are 
defined as trustor and trustee, respectively, and E and F are defined as certifiers. Conversely, B 
can also request A to provide its own trust certifications and then evaluate the trust value of A 
in the same way. 
A C
A D
E B
F B
Previous Interactions
A B
Potential Interaction
C
D
E
F
Trust
Certificaitons
 
Fig. 4. Providing the trust certifications in our LCT model 
 
In the actual interactions, the certifier (i.e. E or F) may refuse to provide its trust 
certification for the purpose of saving energy (as in the case of classic trust models). However, 
this problem is much smaller than that in the classic trust models. In our LCT model, each trust 
certification is provided for only once, while in the classic trust models each trust evaluation is 
collected for many times (The quantitative comparison is shown in Subsection 4.4), so the 
certifier is more likely to provide its trust certification in our LCT model than in the classic 
trust models. Meanwhile, if an entity behaves well, most of its interaction partners would like 
to provide their trust certifications to it, even though a few selfish ones will not do that. Thus it 
still can obtain sufficient trust certifications to prove its own trust. Furthermore, providing the 
trust certification can be taken as a part of the standard trust evaluation procedure and the 
certifier is forced to provide its trust certification [19]. 
As the trust certifications for an entity are stored and provided by itself, these information 
can be carried across domains easily. Besides, in our LCT model the trust certification 
contains digital signature information and any change to the trust certification can be easily 
detected [19], so the trustee cannot modify the trust certification even though it can obtain the 
trust rating values contained in the trust certification. Furthermore, the difficulty of validating 
certain trust certification is much smaller than that of collecting trust evaluations, and the 
validation is merely utilized when necessary. For example, we can optionally examine them 
for improving the efficiency of our approach. 
Aiming at building a lightweight trust model, in this paper we mainly consider the case that 
both interaction partners are in close proximity to each other (i.e. they can directly interact 
with each other) and do not need to depend upon the trust propagation, which requires a 
significant amount of resource consumption. After an interaction, the certifier can directly 
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send its trust certification to the trustee as it is in close proximity to the trustee at that time. 
 
3.2 The Representation of the Trust Certifications 
In our scheme, the trust certification generated by the certifier i  for the trustee j  is denoted as 
equation 1. 
( ), ( ), ( , ),( , ( ), ( , ), ( )) ( ),Id i Id j i j i Tsi j i j Ds i j Rt WgTc                               (1) 
Where ( )Id i  and ( )Id j  denote the ids of the certifier i  and the trustee j , respectively, and 
( , )i jRt  is represented as equation 2. 
 ( , ) ( ( , ,1), ( , ,2), , ( , , ))i j Rt i j Rt i j Rt i j n Rt                         (2) 
Where ( , , )Rt i j m (1 )m n   denotes the rating value of the m-th trust aspect and its value is 
represented in the form of linguistic variables (e.g. “Good”, “Fair” and “Poor”) , which can be 
handled by the fuzzy simple additive weighting system [20]. ( )iWg  is represented as equation 
3. 
 ( ) ( ( ,1), ( ,2), , ( , ))i Wg i Wg i Wg i n Wg                                          (3) 
Where ( , )Wg i m (1 )m n   denotes the interest preference level of corresponding trust 
aspect and its value is also represented in the form of linguistic variables (e.g. “High”, 
“Medium” and “Low”), similar to ( , , )Rt i j m (1 )m n  . ( , )Ts i j  denotes the timestamp when 
the trust certification is generated and ( , )Ds i j  denotes the digital signature information. 
In order to facilitate the trust calculations, we adopt the mapping from linguistic variables to 
fuzzy ratings and crisp ratings for ( , , )Rt i j m  as illustrated in Table 2 [20]. It should be noted 
that the crisp rating ( , , )Rc i j m  in the last column is the signed distance of corresponding fuzzy 
rating ( , , )Rf i j m . For a fuzzy rating ( , , ) ( , , , )Rf i j m a b c d , the value of ( , , )Rc i j m  can be 
gained from equation 4. 
 ( , , ) ( ( , , )) ( ) / 4Rc i j m d Rf i j m a b c d                                       (4) 
 
Table 2. Mapping from linguistic variables to fuzzy ratings and crisp ratings 
Linguistic Variables (Rt) Fuzzy Ratings (Rf) Crisp Ratings (Rc) 
Very poor (VP) (0, 0, 0, 20) 5 
Between very poor and poor (BVPP) (0, 0, 20, 40) 15 
Poor (P) (0, 20, 20, 40) 20 
Between poor and fair (BPF) (0, 20, 50, 70) 35 
Fair (F) (30, 50, 50, 70) 50 
Between fair and good (BFG) (30, 50, 80, 100) 65 
Good (G) (60, 80, 80, 100) 80 
Between good and very good (BGVG) (60, 80, 100, 100) 85 
Very good (VG) (80, 100, 100, 100) 95 
 
Similarly, ( , )Wg i m  can be converted into the fuzzy weight ( , )Wf i m  as illustrated in Table 3 
[20], and the corresponding crisp weight ( , )Wc i m  is computed as shown in equation 5. 
 
1
( ( , ))
( , )
( ( , ))
n
k
d Wf i m
Wc i m
d Wf i k



                                       (5) 
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Table 3. Mapping from linguistic variables to fuzzy weights 
 
Linguistic Variables (Wg) Fuzzy Weights (Wf) 
Very low (VL) (0, 0, 0, 3) 
Low (L) (0, 3, 3, 5) 
Medium (M) (2, 5, 5, 8) 
High (H) (5, 7, 7, 10) 
Very high (VH) (7, 10, 10, 10) 
 
Furthermore, the fuzzy trust score ( , )Sf i j  of ( , )i jTc  can be computed as shown in equation 
6, where the operation   is similar to the standard way of matrix multiplication. Then the 
final trust score ( , )Sc i j  of ( , )i jTc  is obtained from equation 7. 
( , ) ( ( , ,1), ( , , 2),..., ( ,
( ,1)
( , 2)
...
( , )
, ))Sf i j Rf i j Rf i j Rf i j n
Wc i
Wc i
Wc i n
 
 
 
 





                             (6) 
( , ) ( ( , ))Sc i j d Sf i j                                               (7) 
Due to the mapping in Table 2, the derived rating values on all the service aspects range 
from 0 to 100. Besides, the derived preference weights on all the service aspects (in equation 5) 
fall in the range of [0, 1]. Therefore, we can easily find that ( , )Sc i j  is in the range of [0, 100]. 
 
3.3 Three Factors of the Trust Certifications 
Due to the unique characteristic of our trust model, the trustees may just provide the favorable 
trust certifications to their potential interaction partners, and even collude with other entities to 
improve their own trust values. To ease the issue of collusion attacks and make the trust 
certifications more accurate, we comprehensively consider three factors, namely the number 
of the trust certifications, the time decay of the trust certifications and the similarity between 
the trustors and the certifiers. 
A) The Number of the Trust Certifications 
In order to balance the overhead of storage and bandwidth with the robustness against 
collusion attacks, the trustee j  stores ( )n j ( ( ) )n j No  trust certifications, which come from 
( )n j  different certifiers and are the most favourable for itself in our trust evaluation method. 
No  is a system threshold, and it is set such that there are at most ( 1) / 2No     certifiers 
colluding to provide false trust certifications. The weight ( )Wn j  of ( )n j  is denoted as a 
piecewise function as shown in equation 8. 
 
         0 , ( )
( )
1 ,        
if n j N
otherwi e
o
Wn j
s

 

                                      (8) 
If ( )n j  is less than No , the trust certifications are considered as inauthentic, so ( )Wn j  is set 
to 0. Otherwise, the trust certifications are regarded as authentic, so ( )Wn j  is set to 1.  
B) The Time Decay of the Trust Certifications 
Next, we consider the time decay weight ( , )Wt i j  for ( , )i jTc , as the relatively recent trust 
certification is more credible than the less recent one, and the outdated trust certification may 
be incredible at all due to the high mobility and topology changes in the mobile distributed 
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environment. So ( , )Wt i j  is represented as a piecewise function of ( , )Ts i j  as shown in 
equation 9.  
 ( , )
                 ( ,0 ,
( , )
,
)
  
Tn Ts i j
if
Wt
Tn Ts i j Tw
otherw
i j
isee 


 





                                (9) 
Where Tn  is the current timestamp and Tw  is a time window.   is a time unit which 
controls the speed of time decay. If the time difference between Tn  and ( , )Ts i j  exceeds Tw , 
( , )i jTc  is regarded as unreliable, so ( , )Wt i j  is set to 0. Otherwise, ( , )Wt i j  is represented as an 
exponential decay function of ( , )Ts i j  [21]. 
C) The Similarity between the Trustors and the Certifiers 
Except for ( )Wn j  and ( , )Wt i j , the similarity weight ( , , )Ws i j k  should also be considered, 
as a fact that the trust certification from an entity which has similar preferences with itself is 
more convincing than that from an entity which has nothing in common with itself. In the view 
of the trustor k , there is nothing available but ( , )i jTc  regarding to the certifier i , as they may 
be in different domains. Thus the similarity is mainly derived from ( , )i jTc . Two cases are as 
follows: 
Case 1: If the trustor k  has no previous interaction with the trustee j , then the trustor k  
does not have ( , )k jTc , but it can determine ( )Wg k , so ( , , )Ws i j k  can be computed based on 
the weighted Euclidean distance between ( )Wc k  and ( )Wc i  as shown in equation 10 and 11 
[22]. 
 ( , ) 1 , ), (Ws i k Dw i kj                                                   (10) 
2
1
1
( ( , ) ( , )) * ( , )
( , )
( , )
n
m
n
m
Wc k m Wc i m Wc k m
Dw i k
Wc k m






                              (11) 
Case 2: If the trustor k  has previous interactions with the trustee j , then the trustor k  has 
( , )k jTc , so ( , , )Ws i j k  can be gained from the weighted Euclidean distance of both interest 
preference levers and rating vales according to equation 11, 12 and 13 [22], where the 
operation ⊙ is similar to the standard way of vector subtraction. 
 ( , ) 1 ( ( , ) ( , , )) 2, /Ws i k Dw i k Dr i j kj                                        (12) 
2
1
1
( ( ( , , ) ( , , ))) * ( , )1
( , , ) *
100 ( , )
n
m
n
m
d Rf k j m Rf i j m Wc k m
Dr i j k
Wc k m





⊙
                     (13) 
3.4 The Procedure of the Trust Evaluation 
In this subsection, we introduce the procedure of the trust evaluation as shown in Fig. 5. The 
procedure mainly includes four steps as follows: 
A) Provide a Trust Certification 
At the end of the previous interaction, the certifier i  generates ( , )i jTc  and sends it to the 
trustee j . After receiving ( , )i jTc , the trustee j  updates its local storage for preferably 
certifying its own trust in the future. The ( )n j  most favourable trust certifications are selected 
based on the weighted rating value ( , )Rw i j , which is calculated according to equation 14. 
 ( , ) ( , )* ( , )Rw i j Sc i j Wt i j                                       (14) 
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Fig. 5. The procedure of the trust evaluation 
 
B) Request for Trust Certifications 
In the potential interaction, if the trustor k  (may be in a different domain with the certifier 
i ) wants to interact with the trustee j , it sends a request for trust certifications to the trustee 
j . 
C) Provide n Trust Certifications 
When the trustee j  receives the request from a potential interaction partner (i.e. the trustor 
k ), it sends its own ( )n j  trust certifications to the trustor k . Then the trustor k  determines 
their weights and derives the trust value of the trustee j . In concrete terms, the total weight 
( , , )Wa i j k  of ( , )i jTc  can be computed as shown in equation 15, and then the weighted trust 
value ( , , )Ra i j k  of ( , )i jTc  can be gained from equation 16. Finally, the total trust value 
( , )Rx j k  of the trustee j  from the view of the trustor k  can be calculated as shown in equation 
17. 
 ( , , ) ( )* ( , )* ( , ),Wa i j k Wn j Wt i j W i js k                                    (15) 
 ( , , ) ( , )* ( , , )Ra i j k Sc i j Wa i j k                                            (16) 
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                                        (17) 
Due to the normalization processing in equation 8 ~ equation 13, three factor weights, 
namely ( )Wn j , ( , )Wt i j  and ( , ),Ws i j k , all fall in the range of [0, 1], thus we can find that 
( , )Rx j k  ranges from 0 to 100. 
 
D) Interact with Each Other 
If ( , )Rx j k  reaches the trust threshold ( )Ro k  of the trustor k , then the trustor k  trusts the 
trustee j  and agrees to interact with it, otherwise the trustor k  considers that the trustee j  is 
not credible enough and refuses to interact with it or requests it to provide more favourable 
trust certifications. After the interaction, if it occurs, the trustor k  also provides a trust 
certification ( , )k jTc  to the trustee j  as the certifier i  does in the first step of our procedure. 
In other words, the trustor k  acts as a certifier from the point of later potential interactions. 
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It should be added that there exists no trust certification for the newcomers, so their trust 
values derived from the aforementioned evaluation method are 0. To ensure that they have 
certain opportunities to interact with other entities, their trust values are set to a default low 
value To . Meanwhile, the malicious trustees may also act as newcomers and refuse to provide 
the trust certifications as they are unfavourable, thus their trust values are also equal to To . 
4. Experiments and Analysis 
In order to demonstrate the performance of our LCT model, the comprehensive experiments 
and analysis are presented in this section. We first deploy and implement a cross-domain 
scenario, and then we validate the average trust value variations and the average successful 
interaction rates of three kinds of different entities when they move across domains in 
Experiment 1. Furthermore, we compare the performance of our LCT model with that of the 
BN model and the CR model in Experiment 2. Next, we analyse and verify the robustness 
against the collusion attacks as well as the resource consumption of our LCT model in 
Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment 4 shows the performance of our LCT model in the more 
realistic scenarios with comparing to the other outstanding trust models. 
4.1 Experiment Settings 
In our experiments, we employ the standard evaluation indexes (i.e. trust value variation, 
successful interaction rate, robustness against the collusion attacks and resource consumption) 
and prevalent experiment methods, which are widely adopted in related work [3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 14, 
17, 18, 19], to comprehensively measure the performance of our LCT model through 
comparing to the other outstanding trust models. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no existing application or open source dataset yet for the fully distributed 
cross-domain scenario. To facilitate the experiments, we first deploy and implement the 
following cross-domain scenario: There are 6 mutually disjoint domains (Domain 1 to Domain 
6) and 50 trustors in each domain. The trust thresholds of these trustors are randomly 
generated. The investigated entities (i.e. the trustees) move across domains in the sequence of 
Domain 1→Domain 2→Domain 3→Domain 4→Domain 5→Domain 6. When a trustee (e.g. j ) is 
in a domain, it takes an interaction testing with every trustor in this domain. After each 
interaction testing, the timestamp adds 1. If the derived trust value of the trustee j  reaches the 
trust threshold of a trustor (e.g. k ), this interaction testing is regarded as successful, and after 
that, the trustor k  provides the trustee j  with a trust certification, in which the rating values 
are based on the behaviour of the trustee j  and the interest preference levels are randomly 
generated. Three kinds of different entities, namely 10 honest entities (which only provide 
excellent services), 10 general entities (which randomly provide good or terrible services) and 
10 malicious entities (which merely provide terrible services), are separately investigated and 
intercompared. The parameters in our experiments are set as Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The values of the parameters in our experiments 
Parameters Symbols Values 
The number of trust aspects n 3 
The number threshold of Tc  No  20 
The time window Tw  100 
The time unit   40 
The default trust value To  10 
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4.2 Experiment 1 
In this experiment, we mainly validate the average trust value variations of three kinds of 
different entities when they move across domains. Furthermore, we also compute the average 
successful interaction rates for three kinds of different entities in every domain. The 
experiment is repeated 100 times for every entity, and the average results are shown in Fig. 6 
and Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 6. The average trust value variations of three kinds of different entities with the times of interaction 
testings 
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Fig. 7. The average successful interaction rates of three kinds of different entities in every domain 
 
In the beginning, three kinds of different entities have the same initial trust value To  (i.e. 10) 
as they all have no sufficient trust certifications to certify their own trust. With the increase of 
the interaction times, the average trust value of the honest entities rises rapidly (from 10 to 
52.1) as they can provide very favourable trust certifications which contain high rating values, 
and their average successful interaction rate also increases quickly correspondingly (from 15% 
to 73%). Nevertheless, the average trust value of the malicious entities keeps unchanged as To , 
since they cannot provide advantageous trust certifications, and their average successful 
interaction rate also remains about the same (about 15%). In addition, the average trust value 
variation of the general entities (from 10 to 27.1) falls in between that of the honest entities and 
the malicious entities, and so does their average successful interaction rate (from 15% to 39%). 
As we know, interacting with the honest entities brings benefits and interacting with the 
malicious entities means risks. So the average successful interaction rate of the honest entities 
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is the higher, the better, and that of the malicious entities is the lower, the better. Therefore, the 
experiment results indicate that our LCT model can significantly improve the successful 
interaction rates of the honest entities without increasing the risks of interacting with the 
malicious entities. 
4.3 Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we compare the performance of our LCT model with that of the BN model 
and the CR model. As we know, the BN model is an outstanding classic trust model, in which 
the trust information is collected by the trustors from their physical neighbours. This model 
takes various trust aspects and the time window into account, similar to our LCT model. The 
CR model provides a novel “Certified Reputation” idea that the trust information is collected 
by the trustees, instead of the trustors, similar to our LCT model. Thus we choose these two 
trust models for comparison. Moreover, we deploy and necessarily modify the BN model and 
the CR model in our cross-domain scenario. As we know, the ranges of trust values in the BN 
model and the CR model are [0, 1] and [-1, 1], respectively. They are different from that in our 
LCT model, therefore they are all scaled up to [0, 100] for comparison. The experiment is 
repeated 100 times for every entity and every trust model (including the case without any trust 
model), and the average trust value variations of three kinds of different entities in every trust 
model in Domain 6 are shown in Fig. 8. Furthermore, we also compare the average trust value 
variations of the honest entities and the general entities in every trust model in Domain 6 (The 
figures in the other domains are omitted due to space limitation.) as shown in Fig. 9, 
respectively. As the average trust value of the malicious entities in every trust model remains 
the same as To , the figure is omitted. In addition, we also compute the average successful 
interaction rates for three kinds of different entities in every trust model in Domain 6, and the 
outputs are shown in Fig. 10. 
We first analyse the average trust value variation and the average successful interaction rate 
of the honest entities in every trust model in Domain 6 as shown in Fig. 9 (a) and Fig. 10 (the 
left part). In the case without any trust model, the average trust value keeps unchanged as To  
and the average successful interaction rate is also very low (15%) due to lack of a trust 
mechanism to feedback their honest behaviours and improve their trust values. In the BN 
model, their initial average trust value is To , as the BN model does not support cross-domain. 
With the increase of interaction times, their average trust value rises rapidly (from 10 to 39.5) 
due to their good behaviours in the interaction testings, and their average successful 
interaction rate is also relatively high (39%). In the CR model and our LCT model, the trust 
information can be carried across domains due to the “Self-Certified” characteristic, so they 
both have accumulated certain trust levers in the previous domains (Domain 1 to Domain 5) 
and dynamically maintain relatively high trust values in Domain 6. But due to the limitations 
of the CR model mentioned in Section 2, the average trust value in the CR model (21.2) is 
obviously lower than that in our LCT model (50.5), and is even lower than that in the BN 
model (30.8). Correspondingly, the average successful interaction rate in the CR model is 
relatively low (31%) and that in our LCT model is significantly high (72%). 
Next, we analyse the average trust value variation and the average successful interaction 
rate of the malicious entities in every trust model in Domain 6 as shown in Fig. 10 (the right 
part). In the case without any trust model, their average trust value keeps unchanged as To  due 
to lack of a trust mechanism to feedback their behaviours. In the BN model, their average trust 
value will not exceed To  because of their malicious behaviours, and will not be less than To  
in fact due to the “Re-entry” strategy [23], so their average trust value also remains the same as 
To . In the CR model and our LCT model, the malicious entities cannot provide favourable 
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trust certifications to prove their trust, thus their average trust value also keeps unchanged as 
To . Correspondingly, their average successful interaction rate in every trust model is the same 
(15%). 
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Fig. 8. The average trust value variations of three kinds of different entities with the times of interaction 
testings in every trust model in Domain 6 (a) Without any trust model (b) In the BN model (c) In the CR 
model (d) In our LCT model 
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Fig. 9. The average trust value variations of the honest entities and the general entities with the times of 
interaction testings in Domain 6 (a) The honest entities (b) The general entities 
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Fig. 10. The average successful interaction rates of three kinds of different entities in every trust model 
in Domain 6 
 
In addition, the average trust value of the general entities in every trust model (10, 19.7, 14.7 
and 26, respectively) falls in between that of the honest entities and the malicious entities as 
shown in Fig. 9 (b), and so does their average successful interaction rate (15%, 27%, 22% and 
39%, respectively) as shown in Fig. 10 (the middle part). 
Through above analysis, we can discover that our LCT model limits the risks of interacting 
with the malicious entities as well as the other trust models do (15%), but it significantly 
increases the successful interaction rates of the honest entities (by 380%, 85% and 132%, 
respectively) when comparing to the other three trust models. Thus our LCT model obviously 
overmatches the other trust models in our cross-domain scenario. 
4.4 Experiment 3 
In the previous two experiments, we mainly consider the cases without collusion attacks. 
While in this experiment, we focus on analysing and verifying the collusion-resistance ability 
of our LCT model, comparing to the CR model. It should be noted that the comparison with 
the BN model is omitted as there is no consideration of collusion attacks in the BN model. In 
addition, we also analyse and compare the resource consumption in the three trust models. 
A) Collusion-resistance 
In the classic trust models, the collusive entities may provide positive trust evaluations to 
improve the trust values of their companions as well as provide unfavourable trust evaluations 
to slander their competitors. While due to the “Self-Certified” feature in the CR model and our 
LCT model, the trustees will not provide adverse trust certifications, thus the collusive entities 
could only launch the former attack (i.e. providing profitable trust certifications to elevate the 
trust values of their companions). Therefore, in this part we merely need to consider the case 
that the malicious entities collude with others to improve their own trust values. In the CR 
model, the number of trust certifications is not taken as a weight, so the malicious entities are 
able to merely provide the collusive part. As a result, the trust values of the malicious entities 
increase rapidly once there are other entities colluding with them. While in our LCT model, we 
take the number of trust certifications as an important weight. Moreover, a suitable threshold 
No  can be set according to the actual demands such that the maximum number of collusive 
entities is no more than ( 1) / 2No    . Therefore, the trust values of the malicious entities grow 
slowly with the number of collusive entities. 
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Furthermore, we conduct the comprehensive experiment to verify the above analysis. In 
concrete terms, we calculate the trust values of the malicious entities in both the CR model and 
our LCT model when there are 0 ~ 10 (i.e. 0% ~ 50% of No ) entities colluding with them, 
respectively. The experiment is repeated 100 times and the average results are shown in Fig. 
11 (the solid part). To facilitate comparisons, we also draw two baselines (the dashed part) 
according to the average trust values (21.2 and 50.5, respectively) of the honest entities in the 
CR model and our LCT model. 
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Fig. 11. The average trust value variations of the mailicous entities with the number of collusive entities 
in the CR model and our LCT model 
 
In the CR model, the average trust value of the collusive malicious entities is very close to 
that of the honest entities. That is to say, the malicious entities and the honest entities cannot be 
effectively distinguished when there are collusion attacks in the CR model. While in our LCT 
model, the difference between the average trust value of the collusive malicious entities and 
that of the honest entities is large enough even in the extreme case (i.e. the number of collusive 
entities reaches 50% of No ), so the collusive malicious entities and the honest entities can be 
easily divided. The experiment results are consistent with the above analysis, and show that 
our LCT model eases the collusion attacks better than the CR model does. 
B) Resource Consumption 
As we know, interaction round is an important indicator of resource consumption (e.g. time 
and bandwidth) for collecting/providing trust information. So, next we analysis the interaction 
rounds of each domain for collecting/providing trust information in the three trust models, 
respectively. In the BN model, every trustor needs to send a request to its 49 neighbourhood 
entities (which are in the same domain with the trustor) and then receives 49 responses from 
these neighbours, respectively (i.e. 49 rounds for each trustor). So the total interaction rounds 
in each domain can be computed as shown in equation 18. 
(" ") 49*50 2450IR BN                                         (18) 
In the CR model and our LCT model, every trustor needs to send a request to the trustee and 
receive a response from the trustee before the interaction, and then send a trust certification to 
the trustee after the interaction (i.e. 1.5 rounds for each trustor). Thus the total interaction 
rounds in each domain can be calculated as shown in equation 19. 
(" ") (" ") 1.5*50 75IR CR IR LCT                                    (19) 
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The intuitive comparison of interaction rounds in the three trust models is shown in Table 5. 
Through the analysis, we can find that our LCT model significantly decreases the interaction 
rounds (by 96.9%) for collecting/providing trust information when comparing to the BN 
model, as well as the CR model does. As a result, the trust relationships can be rebuilt quickly 
in a lightweight manner when an entity moves across domains in our LCT model. 
 
Table 5. Intuitive comparison of interaction rounds of each domain for collecting/providing trust 
information in the three trust models 
Trust Models Interaction Rounds 
BN [4] 2450 
CR [19] 75 
LCT 75 
4.5 Experiment 4 
In this experiment, we mainly illustrate the performance of our LCT model in the more 
realistic scenarios through comparing to the BN model and the CR model, and the three kinds 
of different entities are comprehensively considered. Different from the settings in Subsection 
4.1, we assume that three kinds of different entities have the same function (e.g. providing the 
same service) and their total number is 100. They move across six different domains together, 
and each trustor evaluates their trust values and selects a trustworthy trustee to interact with for 
only once according to their trust values (i.e. the probability of certain trustee being selected is 
proportional to its trust value). We vary the proportions of the three kinds of different entities 
and then calculate their successful interaction rates in each case in Domain 6 (The data in the 
other domains is omitted due to space limitation.), respectively. This experiment is repeated 
100 times for each case and the average results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. The average successful interaction rates of three kinds of different entities in every case in 
Domain 6 
Cases Without BN [4] CR [19] LCT LCT vs. BN LCT vs. CR 
Case 1 
H (30) 4.7% 28.8% 17.9% 53.6% ↑ 86.1% ↑ 199.4% 
G (60) 9.4% 16.5% 11.9% 18.9% ↑ 14.5% ↑ 58.8% 
M (10) 1.5% 0.7% 0.9% 0.4% ↓ 42.9% ↓ 55.6% 
Case 2 
H (30) 4.6% 36.3% 21.3% 64.1% ↑ 76.6% ↑ 200.9% 
G (10) 1.5% 4.2% 2.8% 4.9% ↑ 16.7% ↑ 75.0% 
M (60) 9.4% 5.6% 6.8% 3.9% ↓ 30.4% ↓ 42.6% 
Case 3 
H (10) 1.5% 24.4% 13.9% 48.1% ↑ 97.1 % ↑ 246.0% 
G (30) 4.6% 15.3% 9.4% 19.8% ↑ 29.4% ↑ 110.6% 
M (60) 9.4% 6.3% 7.5% 5.0% ↓ 20.6% ↓ 33.3% 
Case 4 
H (33) 5.2% 32.3% 19.9% 59.1% ↑ 83.0% ↑ 197.0% 
G (33) 5.1% 11.0% 7.4% 12.1% ↑ 10.0% ↑ 63.5% 
M (34) 5.3% 2.7% 3.5% 1.8% ↓ 33.3% ↓ 48.6% 
Case 5 
H (10) 1.5% 28.0% 15.6% 54.9% ↑ 96.1% ↑ 252.0% 
G (10) 1.5% 8.3% 4.3% 10.1% ↑ 21.7% ↑ 134.9% 
M (80) 12.5% 9.6% 10.8% 8.0% ↓ 16.7% ↓ 25.9% 
Note: “Without” is short for “Without any trust model”; “H”, “G” and “M” represent the honest entities, 
the general entities and the malicious entities, respectively, and the numbers behind them denote their 
proportions; “↑” and “↓” represent improvement and reduction, respectively. 
 
In concrete terms, we consider five cases (i.e. Case 1 ~ Case 5) in this experiment and the 
proportions in these cases are different. When there is no trust model, the average successful 
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interaction rates of the three kinds of different entities in all the five cases are approximately 
proportional to their numbers. While when there is certain trust model (i.e. the BN model, the 
CR model or our LCT model), the average successful interaction rates of the honest entities 
and the general entities increase and that of the malicious entities decreases (as the proportion 
of their trust values decreases with the increasing trust values of the other kinds of entities) in 
all the five cases. Besides, among the three trust models, our LCT model has better 
performance than the BN model and the CR model. Take the extreme case (i.e. Case 5) for 
example. Although the proportion of the honest entities is very small (10%), their average 
successful interaction rate in our LCT model is quite high (54.9%), and it is greatly higher than 
that in the BN model (28.0%) and the CR model (15.6%). Analogously, the average successful 
interaction rate of the general entities in our LCT model (10.1%) is relatively higher than that 
in the BN model (8.3%) and the CR model (4.3%). Moreover, although the proportion of the 
malicious entities is rather large (80%), their average successful interaction rate in our LCT 
model is quite low (8.0%) and it is relatively lower than that in the BN model (9.6%) and the 
CR model (10.8%). In the other four cases, we can also get the similar conclusions.  
Through above analysis, we can easily find that our LCT model greatly increases the 
average successful interaction rate of the honest entities and improves that of the general 
entities to some extent when comparing to the BN model and the CR model. Besides, our LCT 
model is also slightly better than the other two trust models in reducing the risks of interacting 
with the malicious entities. Thus our LCT model significantly outperforms the BN model and 
the CR model in our cross-domain scenarios. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel LCT model, in which the trust certifications are 
collected and provided by the trustees and the trust information can be carried across domains, 
for the mobile distributed environment in a fully distributed way. The trust ratings in the trust 
certifications contain various trust aspects with different interest preference weights, and they 
are donated by the linguistic variables, which can be handled by the fuzzy simple additive 
weighting system. Furthermore, we have comprehensively considered three factors to ease the 
issue of collusion attacks and make the trust certifications more accurate. Finally, we have 
deployed and implemented a cross-domain scenario, and conducted the comprehensive 
experiments and analysis. The results demonstrate that our LCT model greatly improves the 
successful interaction rates of the honest entities without increasing the risks of interacting 
with the malicious entities, and significantly outperforms the BN model and the CR model in 
our cross-domain scenario. 
In the future, we aim to improve our LCT model and apply it to the realistic mobile 
e-commerce scenario, as the vendors may move across domains and need to prove their own 
trust to potential consumers for the purpose of enjoying the trust of more consumers and 
improving their transaction volumes. 
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